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A Defense of the Electoral College
in the Age of Trump
John Yoo*

Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, where Donald J.
Trump lost the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes but still secured victory
in the Electoral College, renewed efforts to delegitimize or abolish the Electoral College system have surfaced.
Critics, calling for a direct national vote for President, attacked the legitimacy of the election and decried the Constitution’s method of presidential
selection as antiquated and undemocratic. Some legal scholars even suggested that the Electoral College must be abolished to disentangle it from
America’s racist past and history of slavery. Recently, though, reformers in
several States have banded together to promote a pact known as the National
Popular Vote initiative, an interstate agreement that would assign a State’s
electoral votes to whichever candidate wins the national popular vote and
would go into effect as soon as legislation is passed in a sufficient number of
states to constitute an electoral majority.
In this Essay, I respond to current criticisms of the Electoral College by
providing a historical perspective on the Framers’ decision-making throughout the drafting and ratification process and discuss how the Electoral College’s roots in federalism still remain relevant today. Ultimately, I caution
against an overreaction to the 2016 election despite the Electoral College’s
failure to filter out a candidate such as Trump. I argue that the alternative to
the Electoral College—a system of direct election that would not benefit from
the state structure to dissipate and diffuse rash popular movements—could be
even more deleterious to American democracy, as it presents a far higher risk
of electing a demagogue and falling prey to the tyranny of the majority.
* Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
I thank Helena Gu and Allison Murray for their excellent research assistance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For a populist, Donald J. Trump strangely owes his presidential victory
to a Constitution that limits mass democracy.1
On Election Day, 65,853,514 Americans voted for the Democratic Party
ticket of Hillary Clinton for President and Tim Kaine for Vice President.2
Slightly less, 62,984,828, chose Donald Trump and Mike Pence.3
But Trump still won, thanks to the Constitution.4 The Founders rejected
direct popular election of the nation’s Chief Executive.5 Instead, the Constitution requires that voters choose “electors” from their state, who meet to select a President and Vice President.6 Each state receives electoral votes equal
to their representation in the House, plus two for their Senators.7 Because of
the extra two votes, the Electoral College (a phrase nowhere used in the Constitution) gives an advantage to smaller states, which otherwise would be
swamped by their larger sisters.8 The smallest state in the Union, Wyoming
(563,767 residents in 2010), receives three electoral votes, while the largest,
California (37,254,503 residents), receives 55.9
Trump won the vote of the electors by 304–227.10 While Clinton won a
plurality of the popular vote, 48.18 percent to Trump’s 46.09 percent, Trump
1. See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and Overview, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 966 (2016) (“Americans now fully appreciate that presidential candidates are
vying for a majority of the Electoral College votes, rather than the individual votes of constituents.”).
2. Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results (2017), FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Jan. 30,
2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also Nicholas G. Karambelas, The
Electoral College and the Race to 270, 72 J. MO. B. 260, 260 (2016) (noting that where no candidate
receives 270 electoral votes, the U.S. House of Representatives elects the president and the Senate
elects the vice president, rendering the popular vote meaningless).
5. See Goldfeder, supra note 1, at 966–67 (noting that Founders like James Madison, “urged a
direct national popular vote for President, but this . . . was defeated because the Founders worried it
would lead to uncertain results”).
6. Id. at 967; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
8. See generally Karambelas, supra note 4, at 260 (“The term ‘electoral college’ does not appear
in the Constitution . . . . Generally, there is one representative for every 500,000 people in a state.”).
9. See William Petrocelli, Voters in Wyoming Have 3.6 Times the Voting Power That I Have. It’s
Time to End the Electoral College, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2016, 4:52 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/its-time-to-end-the-electoral-college_b_12891764.
10. See Federal Elections 2016: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives, FED. ELECTION COMM’N 6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/
fe2016/federalelections2016.pdf (last visited March 14, 2019).
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won by a comfortable 57 percent margin in the Electoral College.11 Even
though, as we will see, Trump evaded the Framers’ original purpose behind
the Electoral College, he won fair and square under its modern rules.
Critics immediately attacked the legitimacy of Trump’s election. The
New York Times declared the Constitution’s system for selecting the President “antiquated” and called for a direct national vote for President.12 The
Electoral College, it argued, “is more than just a vestige of the founding era;
it is a living symbol of America’s original sin” because it originally advantaged slave states in the electoral count.13 In an interview with CNN, Hillary
Clinton agreed that the electoral college “needs to be eliminated,”14 and 2000
presidential candidate Al Gore argued that adopting a popular vote for President will “stimulate public participation in the democratic process like nothing
else we could possibly do.”15 Not to be outdone, retiring Senator Barbara
Boxer filed a lawsuit to overturn the results of the electoral vote and declared:
“The Electoral College is an outdated, undemocratic system that does not reflect our modern society, and it needs to change immediately. Every American should be guaranteed that their vote counts.”16
Critics of the Constitution’s method of presidential selection could appeal
to an unlikely ally: the winner of the 2016 contest.17 Four years earlier, Trump
had declared that the Electoral College was “a disaster for democracy.”18
Shortly after his 2016 victory, the President-elect even conceded: “I would
11. Id.
12. The Editorial Board, Time to End the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/opinion/time-to-end-the-electoral-college.html.
13. Id.
14. Dan Merica, Clinton: It’s Time to Abolish the Electoral College, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/13/politics/hillary-clinton-anderson-cooper-electoral-collegecnntv/index.html
15. Rebecca Savransky, Al Gore: End the Electoral College, HILL (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:24 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/307966-al-gore-says-he-supports-elimination-ofelectoral-college.
16. Sarah D. Wire, California Sen. Barbara Boxer Files Long Shot Bill to Scrap The Electoral
College System, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016 10:37 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/lapol-ca-essential-politics-updates-boxer-files-longshot-bill-to-scrap-the-1479234745-htmlstory.html
(quoting Barbara Boxer).
17. See Louis Nelson, Trump Pushes to Swap Electoral College for Popular Vote, POLITICO (April
26, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/26/trump-electoral-college-popularvote-555148 (acknowledging Donald Trump’s support for doing away with the Electoral College for
presidential elections).
18. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:45 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/266038556504494082?lang=en.
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rather see it where you went with simple votes. You know, you get 100 million votes, and somebody else gets 90 million votes and you win. There’s a
reason for doing this because it brings all the states into play.”19 Even as recently as April 2018, Trump called into the morning news show Fox &
Friends to wish that direct popular vote settled presidential elections, because
“to me, it’s much easier to win the popular vote.”20 He recognized, however,
that a direct popular election would demand a different strategy from the electoral college: “I would rather have a popular election, but it’s a totally different campaign. If you’re a runner, you’re practicing for the hundred-yard dash
as opposed to the mile.”21
Attacks on the Electoral College after the 2016 election echoed the controversy surrounding the 2000 contest.22 Democratic candidate Al Gore
barely won the popular vote, 50,999,897 to 50,456,002, a difference of 0.5
percent.23 But George W. Bush won the Electoral College vote 271 to 266.24
Only a month-long dispute, and the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore, awarded a 537-vote winning margin in Florida—and an Electoral College majority—to Bush.25 As is the case today, critics of the 2000
election argued that Bush lacked legitimacy because he had won the Electoral
College but not the popular vote.26 But while the 2000 election ended up in a
19. The Editorial Board, Let the People Pick the President, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www. nytimes.com/2017/11/07/opinion/elections-electoral-college-voting.html.
20. George Will, The President Who Knew Too Little About the Electoral College, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (May 3, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/president-trump-electoral-college-complaints-unfounded/.
21. Josiah Peterson, Keep the Electoral College, Because States Matter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May
4, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/electoral-college-important-stateshave-unique-political-interests/.
22. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair From Day One, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/opinion/the-electoral-college-unfair-from-day-one.html
[hereinafter Amar, The Electoral College]; Akhil R. Amar, States Don’t Use an Electoral College to
Choose Their Leader, Neither Should the Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016, 3:20 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/11/16/should-the-electoral-college-be-abolished
[hereinafter Amar, Neither Should the Nation].
23. 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last updated Dec. 2001).
24. Id.
25. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curium) (finding that Florida’s “use of standardless manual recounts” violated the Equal Protection Clause).
26. See Alison Mitchell, Over Some Objections, Congress Certifies Electoral Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/07/us/over-some-objections-congress-certifieselectoral-vote.html (“There is overwhelming evidence that George W. Bush did not win this election
either by national popular vote or the Florida popular vote . . . .”).

837

[Vol. 46: 833, 2019]

A Defense of the Electoral College
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

virtual dead heat, with only 500,000 votes out of 101 million cast separating
Bush and Gore, the 2016 election decisively awarded the popular vote to Hillary Clinton, who won by a margin of about 3 million votes.27 Trump became
the fifth President, along with John Quincy Adams (1824), Rutherford Hayes
(1876), Benjamin Harrison (1888), and George W. Bush (2000), to lose the
popular vote and still enter the White House.28
There is no doubt that the Constitution’s system for picking the President
runs against the majoritarian grain.29 It does not appear that any other nation
uses anything like it.30 The Constitution relies on direct election of other federal officers, such as members of the House and Senators.31 Nor do the states
mimic the Constitution.32 The majority (or plurality) of voters choose the nation’s 50 governors and all state legislators.33
Trump’s 2016 win prompted critics to attribute a more nefarious purpose
to the Electoral College than simply giving the states a greater say in the creation of the national government.34 As noted earlier, the New York Times
editorial board tied the Electoral College to America’s “original sin” of slavery.35 The Times’ charge of racism echoed those by serious legal scholars. In
an opinion piece published shortly after Trump’s victory, Yale law professor
Akhil Amar declared: “Standard civics-class accounts of the Electoral College
rarely mention the real demon dooming direct national election in 1787 and

27. See Federal Elections 2016: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 10; Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results
(2017), supra note 2.
28. See Eva Ball, Presidential Elections and Controversy: A Look Back at Election 2000, 42
DOCUMENTS TO PEOPLE 8, 9 (2014).
29. See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 481,
533 (1997) (“[T]he electoral college route to selection of a President . . . [is] evidence that our democracy is not so insistently majoritarian . . . .”).
30. See Drew DeSilver, Among Democracies, U.S. Stands Out in How it Chooses its Head of State,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/22/among-democracies-u-s-stands-out-in-how-it-chooses-its-head-of-state/ (finding that no other democratic nation fills
its top position the way the U.S. does, with a body of “electors”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII.
32. See, e.g., Governors’ Powers & Authority, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/
consulting/powers-and-authority/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (explaining that all state governors are
popularly elected).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Amar, Neither Should the Nation, supra note 22.
35. See The Editorial Board, supra note 12.
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1803: slavery.”36 Similarly, legal historian Paul Finkelman argued after the
2000 election that most Americans, and even many experts, have no idea that
the Framers designed the Electoral College to protect slavery.37
Accusations of racism follow Trump wherever he goes, but they miss the
mark here. As we will see, they stem from a single comment by James Madison during the secret Philadelphia Convention that drafted the Constitution.38
Instead of a device infused with racism, the Electoral College emerged as an
imperfect compromise that sought to balance nationalism with states’ rights,
to leaven democracy’s passions with deliberation and reason.39 It may seem
ramshackle to us today, but the Constitution’s method of presidential choice
sought to advance the voice of the people over the centrifugal forces of federalism and the threat of legislative capture.40
To overcome this collective action problem, reformers have asked states
to adopt a National Popular Vote initiative (NPV), in which a state would give
all of its electoral votes to whoever won a national majority (even if the loser
won the vote in the state itself).41 For example, if Pennsylvania were to adopt
the NPV, it would award its electoral votes to a Democrat who won the national vote, even if a Republican had won the popular vote in Pennsylvania
itself.42 The NPV pact, however, does not take effect until states representing
a majority of electoral votes have adopted it, at least 270 electoral votes, and
it may well fall afoul of the Constitution’s ban on agreements between the
states without congressional approval.43
This Essay will proceed in three parts. Part II will briefly describe the
36. Akhil Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists, TIME (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:16
PM), http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-history-slavery/.
37. Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145,
1147 (2002).
38. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56–57 (Max Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter 2 FERRAND’S RECORDS] (noting that James Madison stated that the people at large were
the most fit to choose a president, but the serious difficulty was that “[t]he right of suffrage was much
more diffusive in the Norther than the Southern States”).
39. See Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237,
1243, 1248 (2012).
40. See Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV.
195, 205 (2004) (discussing the Framers’ quickness to compromise on the proposed solution of an
electoral college because each state would have an equal say).
41. See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE (July 3, 2018), https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation.
42. See id. (explaining that the national popular vote winner would be the candidate “who receives
the most popular votes from all 50 states and the District of Columbia” on Election Day).
43. See id.
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controversy over the Electoral College.44 Part III will trace the history of the
drafting and ratification of the Electoral College.45 Part IV will discuss why
the Electoral College’s roots in federalism still remain relevant today.46
II. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AT WORK
If there is a widely held understanding of the Electoral College today, it
is probably that the Framers took the election of the President out of the hands
of the people because they distrusted the masses. Under the old theory that
the Framers sought to protect the rights of the wealthy, the Framers acted out
of a fear of democracy’s leveling tendencies.47 Elbridge Gerry, inventor of
the gerrymander, best expressed this perspective at the Philadelphia Convention when he declared that “[t]he evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy.”48 Gerry did not attack the people’s character, only its innocence:
“The people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended patriots.”49 As
a delegate from Massachusetts, Gerry would have held an understandable fear
of populism after the disorder of Shays’ Rebellion the previous year had
prompted calls for stronger government. While debating the Presidency in
the summer of 1787, Gerry predictably declared: “The popular mode of electing the Chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all.”50 In his opinion,
“[t]he people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men.”51
Imagine what Gerry would have made of Trump, who appealed to the
pessimistic side of the American people. We might not blame him for opposing a popular role in picking a new President, but Gerry lost. The Framers
rejected the system under the Articles of Confederation, America’s Constitution version 1.0, which did not even create an executive office.52 While assembled in the Continental Congress, the states simply chose a presiding

44. See discussion infra Part II.
45. See discussion infra Part III.
46. See discussion infra Part IV.
47. See Finkelman, supra note 37, at 1148.
48. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS].
49. Id.
50. 2 FERRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 57.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777; Continental Congress, 6 CONST. REV. 148,
156 (1922).
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officer of few powers for administrative convenience.53 The Framers also shot
down proposals in the Constitutional Convention to allow the states to select
the President directly or through the Senate. They also deleted from the first
draft of the Constitution direct selection of the Chief Executive by the legislature. Properly understood, the Electoral College advanced, rather than denied, democracy.
Criticism has long followed the Electoral College, and sporadic efforts to
change it have come close to success. After the election of Richard Nixon,
for example, the American Bar Association declared that the “electoral college method of electing a President of the United States is archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous.”54 A half-century before
Trump’s election, the controversies over John F. Kennedy’s close 1960 margin and George Wallace’s 1968 third-party candidacy led to the strongest
movement in our history to discard the Constitution’s original electoral system.55 A proposal to amend the Constitution to a direct election system even
overwhelmingly passed the House by 339 to 70, and supporters claimed polls
showed that an amendment had the support of roughly two thirds of state legislators.56 But ever since the Twelfth Amendment, enacted after the election
of 1800 to separate the votes for President and Vice President, the United
States has never seen fit to alter its method for choosing Presidents.
Criticism, however, has long followed the Electoral College. Its primary
vulnerability, of course, is that it selects Presidents not chosen by a majority
of the American people.57 While in most cases the Electoral College has
reached the same outcome, a number of our modern Presidents have still won
the Oval Office without a majority.58 This includes not just presidents who
lost to winners of the majority vote, such as Donald Trump and George W.
Bush, but also those who captured only a plurality, such as Bill Clinton
(twice), Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Richard Nixon. Some of our
most consequential Presidents have won in this way, such as Abraham

53. Continental Congress, 6 CONST. REV. 148, 156 (1922).
54. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTORAL REFORM 4 (1967).
55. See JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 18–20 (1971).
56. Id. at 20.
57. THOMAS H. NEALE, ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 5–7 (2017).
58. Id. at 7.
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Lincoln in 1860 and Woodrow Wilson in 1912.59 A majority vote system may
not have produced the best outcomes for the nation if it had kept Abraham
Lincoln and Harry Truman out of the White House.
Then there is the possible randomness of the system. If a third-party candidate can deprive a winner of an Electoral College majority, the choice could
go to the House, where states vote by delegation.60 The House could select a
candidate who also does not represent the majority of the population, and the
choice could fall prey to legislative deal-making.61 In 1824, even though Andrew Jackson won the most electoral votes, he did not have a majority. When
the election went to the House, it chose John Quincy Adams instead, with
Henry Clay allegedly throwing the support of his party to Adams in exchange
for appointment as Secretary of State. Small states have an equal vote with
large states, amplifying even further the pro-federalism structure of the presidential selection process at the expense of majoritarianism.62
The system also relies on a certain randomness in its operation. In our
winner-take-all system (a product of state law), candidates will not campaign
in states where a large majority favors them or their opponent. Trump did not
challenge Hillary Clinton in California, where Democrats had a majority in
the millions, while Clinton did not contest Texas.63 Candidates ignored other
states with large populations that heavily favored one party or the other—New
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts saw little of Trump or Clinton.64 Candidates
instead will focus their competition on states where the election is close.65
Most of the election budgets will go toward the states which combine electoral
votes with competitiveness.66 In the 2016 election, the candidates devoted a
large portion of their spending to “battleground” states such as Florida, Ohio,
59. See Historical Election Results, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://www.archives
.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
61. See NEALE, supra note 57, at 8 (stating that critics argue that in contingent election situations,
the members of the House can exercise their choice “without regard to the winners of the popular vote
in their district, states, or in the nation at large”).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see NEALE, supra note 57, at 11.
63. See Matthew Conlen, The Last 10 Weeks of 2016 Campaign Stops in One Handy Gif,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 16, 2016, 3:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-last-10-weeksof-2016-campaign-stops-in-one-handy-gif/.
64. See NEALE, supra note 57, at 13.
65. See id. at 4 n.18.
66. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Count ‘Em, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2006), https://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2006/03/06/count-em-2 (reporting that in the 2004 election, the candidates spent a total of $237 million on advertising, with $229 million of it spent in the thirteen battleground states).
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and Pennsylvania.67 Battleground states may have little importance to the nation as a whole or bear similarity to the country’s majority, while states with
large populations might go unnoticed.68
When it comes to the nation’s most powerful office, the majority does not
necessarily pick the winner. A strategic candidate could win bare popular
majorities in enough states to carry the Electoral College, but then lose by
large margins in the most populous states.69 According to the 2010 census,
about half of the American population lives in the largest eight states (California, Texas, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and Georgia),
but those states represent only 225 out of the 270 electoral votes needed to
win.70 A candidate could assemble the electoral votes of the smallest states
and essentially concede in the largest states, and still prevail.71 Whether by
intention or luck, Trump now sits in the Oval Office by following such a
plan.72 Though he won in Texas and Florida, Trump did not contest California, New York, or Illinois.73 The state-based allocation of electoral votes, and
the extra two electoral votes for every state, create the possibility of losing the
popular vote but winning the election.74
The American political system need not allow the Constitution to produce
67. See Anthony Terrell, Trump Out-Campaigned Clinton by 50 Percent in Key Battleground
States in Final Stretch, NBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics
/2016-election/trump-out-campaigned-clinton-50-percent-key-battlegrounds-final-100-n683116.
68. See Hertzberg, supra note 66.
69. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, at
27–30 (1999) (identifying four types of situations where the winner of the majority vote might not win
the election, including elections where “there was an electoral college reversal of the popular vote
winner,” where “there was an electoral college deadlock and use of the House contingent procedure,”
where “the president elected did not have a majority of the popular votes,” and where “minor vote
shifts could have changed the outcome”).
70. See Paul Mackun & Steve Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf; Distribution
of Electoral Votes, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/fed eralregister/electoral-college/allocation.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2010).
71. See Hertzberg, supra note 66.
72. See Nate Silver, Donald Trump Had a Superior Electoral College Strategy, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/donald-trump-had-a-superior-electoral-collegestrategy/ (stating that Donald Trump was “pretty close to having an optimal Electoral College strategy”
based on his strategy to focus on the “tipping-point states” rather than the “close states”).
73. See NEALE, supra note 57, at 15 n.71 (identifying California, New York, and Illinois as the
three biggest “blue wall” states, meaning those states that consistently vote for Democratic Party candidates in presidential elections).
74. See LONGLEY & PIERCE, supra note 69, at 135–38 (discussing how the “winner-take-all” system and the two additional electoral votes can cause the popular vote winner to lose the electoral vote).
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such a result. Presidential candidates could always commit to conceding the
election, no matter the Electoral College result, should they lose the popular
vote.75 It is difficult to imagine an Electoral College winner, given the power
of the modern American presidency, living up to such a principle, just as Donald Trump could not follow through on his 2012 words.
But political reform need not rely simply on the candidates. The key reason why the Electoral College can choose a President who loses the popular
vote rests in federalism. Article II of the Constitution mandates that “Each
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors.”76 In the earliest American elections, states used a variety of methods for choosing electors, ranging from direct election to selection
by the state legislatures themselves.77 While the South Carolina legislature
would continue to choose electors until the Civil War, most states soon allowed the popular vote to select the electors.78 But the states also adopted a
rule that reinforced the partially federal, partially state nature of the constitutional system.79 Most states follow a winner-take-all rule, also known as the
“unit” rule, which gives all of a state’s electoral votes to the winner of the
statewide popular vote.80 Win a plurality of the popular vote within enough
states that hold 270 electoral votes, and a candidate wins the election, even
without a national majority.81
States, therefore, have it in their hands to prevent another Donald Trump
from ever winning a presidential election with a minority. States could allocate their electoral votes proportionally, so that if a Democrat were to win
Pennsylvania by 60–40 percent, the state would divide its 20 votes and give
12 electoral votes to the Democrat and eight to the Republican.82 Only two
states, Maine and Nebraska, however, divide their votes proportionally.83 But
75. See id. at 51.
76. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
77. See LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 69, at 102 (stating that under the Constitution, state legislatures had broad authority to decide how the electors were chosen, whether that meant choosing the
electors themselves, or giving the choice to the people through the popular vote).
78. Id.
79. See NEALE, supra note 57, at 6–7.
80. Id. at 10.
81. See Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One Person, One
Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2536–57 (2001).
82. Id.; see Bill Whalen, Go Ahead and Change the Electoral College, But There’s Still a Trump
Presidency, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/billwhalen/2018/08/12/go-ahead-and-the-changethe-electoral-college-but-theres-still-a-trump-presidency/#5271a95d14ca (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
83. U.S. Electoral College, Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
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states realize that were they to adopt such a rule, candidates would shift their
time and resources to states where they have a chance to win all of the electoral votes.84 It is the states (both big and small), rather than the Constitution,
which maintains a system that allows a candidate to win the Electoral College
without winning the nationwide majority vote.85
In the wake of the 2000 and 2016 elections, a new criticism has arisen.
According to leading legal scholars, regardless of its anti-majoritarian tendencies, the Electoral College also advances a racist agenda through its protection
of slavery.86 “[T]he records of the Convention show that in fact the connection between slavery and the college was deliberate, and very much on the
minds of many delegates, including James Madison,” argues legal historian
Paul Finkelman.87 Because of the Electoral College’s inclusion of the threefifth’s rule, Amar notes, Virginia started out with 12 out of the first 91 electoral votes; even though Pennsylvania by 1800 would have 10 percent more
free people than Virginia, it would have 20 percent less electoral votes.88
“Perversely, the more slaves Virginia (or any other slave state) bought or bred,
the more electoral votes it would receive.”89 Indeed, as Amar notes, a southern state that freed slaves who left for the North would actually lose electoral
votes.90 Finkelman observes that John Adams would have won the tight election of 1800 over Thomas Jefferson if the Constitution had not incorporated
the three-fifths rule into the Electoral College.91 Amar agrees: “Jefferson metaphorically rode into the executive mansion on the backs of slaves.”92
This relatively new claim not only has risen to attack the Trump presidency, but it also undermines the legitimacy of the system we have used for
more than two centuries to choose our presidents. It gives an added impetus
to efforts to replace the Electoral College with some kind of national direct
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
84. See Joan Indiana Rigdon, Electoral College Reform?, 22 WASH. LAW. 22, 25 (2007).
85. See Muller, supra note 39, at 1250 (noting that the Electoral College is in the states’ best interest because “it is not simply a mechanism for state-based representation in selection of the President,
but it is also a mechanism by which the states simultaneously administer the election and select electors as they see fit”).
86. Finkelman, supra note 37, at 1147
87. Id.
88. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and Future, 33
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 470 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Finkelman, supra note 37, at 1155.
92. Amar, supra note 88, at 470.
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election of the President, though majoritarianism has not always been the best
friend of minority rights. The next Part will describe the development of the
Electoral College during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution to
show that race had relatively little to do with it.93 While a stray comment in
the Philadelphia Convention may have pointed out the benefits to the southern
states of the Electoral College system, this point did not seem to come to the
attention of those who ratified the Constitution.94 Further, any benefit would
have disappeared with the erasure of the Constitution’s protection for slavery
in the Reconstruction Amendments.95 It is to that history that we now turn.
III. THE DEBATES THAT CREATED THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The Electoral College, for all of its ramshackle nature, provoked little debate during the process of the Constitution’s approval in 1788. “The mode of
appointment of the Chief Magistrate,” Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist 68, “is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which
has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark
of approbation from its opponents.”96 Hamilton, who argued openly for an
energetic executive of independent powers, even declared: “I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect,
it is at least excellent.”97
Hamilton may have accurately described the ratification process, in which
the Constitution went before each state’s specially-elected conventions. Critics of the new framework for government devoted most of their energies attacking the expansion of federal authority at the expense of the states, the
Senate’s strange mixture of roles, or the powers of the new presidency.98 Antifederalists did not spend much effort on the Electoral College.99 If there
were a purpose to defend slavery or racism in the Constitution’s system for
selecting its Chief Executive, it did not garner much notice or debate during
93. See discussion infra Part III.
94. See Amar, supra note 88, at 470.
95. See Muller, supra note 39, at 1250.
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
97. Id. at 411–12.
98. Id. at 414–15; see Nils Gilbertson, Return of the Skeptics: The Growing Role of the Anti-Federalists in Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 261, 267, 283
(2018).
99. Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress
for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 37 n.5 (1986).
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the ratification, which was the process that actually gave the Constitution its
legal and political authority.100
But Hamilton’s words could not fairly describe the Constitutional Convention. Meeting in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, delegates from the
states secretly drafted a new framework for the national American government.101 The mechanism of presidential selection balanced many of the same
competing forces that affected the design of the rest of the Constitution: the
struggle between big states and little states, nationalism versus federalism,
North versus South, free states versus slave.102 In the course of a few months,
the Framers would consider a wide range of ways to select a President. The
Electoral College represents their improvement on the Articles of Confederation, but with the compromises necessary for broad approval.
Early proposals for the Constitution would have created a system not unlike the parliamentary democracies of western Europe. Drafted by James
Madison and introduced by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29,
1787, the Virginia Plan created a national executive to “be chosen by the National Legislature.”103 The delegates swiftly set out the same competing visions for presidential selection which endure today. When discussion of the
Virginia Plan began on June 1, Pennsylvania delegate and future Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson argued that “in theory he was for an election by
the people.”104 He pointed to the experience in Massachusetts and New York,
which showed “that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large,
was both a convenient [and] successful mode.”105 Roger Sherman of Connecticut took immediate exception.106 He “was for the appointment by the
Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body.”107
If Sherman and the Virginia Plan had prevailed, the American executive
would look similar, if not identical, to a European democracy. In these parliamentary systems, the majority party of the legislature chooses a prime minister who heads the executive—there is no true separation of powers between
100. On the importance of the state ratification conventions, see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND:
A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH, at ch. 2 (2009).
101. Id.
102. See Slonim, supra note 99, at 37.
103. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 48, at 21–22.
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id.
106. See Slonim, supra note 99, at 40 (explaining one argument for why the presidential election
should not be left up to the people at large).
107. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 48, at 68.
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the two branches. Many of the Framers, however, believed that legislative
control over the executive in the revolutionary state constitutions had produced unstable and unfair laws, government favoritism and partisanship, and
flagrant abuse of property and contract rights.108 To reduce congressional influence over the President, George Mason persuaded the Convention to limit
the executive to a single seven-year term, without possibility of re-election.109
But Mason hit roadblocks with his effort to remove the legislature from the
process of electing the President. He proposed the first version of the Electoral College: the Constitution would divide the states into districts, which
would select “[m]embers for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive [Magistry].”110 His motion, however, failed 7–2 (with one abstention),
and the Convention kept to its plan that the legislature elect the president by
an 8–2 vote.111
Representatives from the smaller states had even more plans in store for
the presidency.112 With their New Jersey Plan, introduced on June 15, these
delegates proposed that each state have equal representation in the Congress,
and that no house exist with seats allocation by population.113 The conflict
between large and small states paralyzed the Constitutional Convention for a
month.114 When it ended in the Great Compromise, the smaller states had won
a significant change to the centrality of a popularly-elected legislature in the
Virginia Plan.115 The Senate, in which each state received two senators, became the central institution in the legislature.116 Legislation could not pass
without its cooperation; presidents could not make treaties or appoint judges
and high officers without its advice and consent; a constitutional amendment
could not go to the states without the agreement of two-thirds of the senators;
and, it acted as the judge and jury in impeachment trials.117 The rise of the
Senate gave the states an effective veto over Congress’s election of the
108. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969).
109. Slonim, supra note 99, at 37–38.
110. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 48, at 77.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 242–45; see Slonim, supra note 99, at 39.
113. See Slonim, supra note 99, at 37, 39.
114. Id. at 39 (explaining that the controversy was not settled until July 7).
115. Id.; see Jack N. Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424, 436 (1987).
116. See Rakove, supra note 115, at 455.
117. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 48, at 186–88 (discussing relevant portions of the
Virginia Plan).
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President.
Large state delegates spent the remainder of the Constitutional Convention attempting to restore the popular voice in the Constitution. As I have
argued elsewhere, nationalists at this point began to shift authority away from
the Senate to the President.118 They also sought to break presidential dependency on Congress. Re-opening debate over presidential selection on July 17,
Gouverneur Morris demanded that the President “ought to be elected by the
people at large, by the freeholders of the Country,” who would “never fail to
prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might
so speak, of continental reputation.”119 If Congress selected him, on the other
hand, “[h]e will be the mere creature of the Legisl[ature]” and the choice
would be “the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction.”120 In response to
delegates worried that a majority of the American people would not agree on
a single candidate, Wilson proposed sending such deadlocks to Congress.
Opponents of the majoritarian revival stressed several concerns that have
resurfaced in the Trump years. Sherman argued that the people would “never
be sufficiently informed” and would tend to choose candidates from their own
states, which would give larger states the advantage.121 Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina feared “a few active & designing men”—demagogues—
would manipulate the people, or that “[t]he most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual will be able to carry their points.”122 Even
though from a large state, Virginian George Mason agreed that “the extent of
the Country” made it nearly impossible for the people to “have the requisite
capacity” to judge the candidates.123 “[I]t would be as unnatural to refer the
choice of a proper character for a chief Magistrate to the people,” Mason declared, “as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man.”124 Mason’s
statement often supplies the evidence for those who believe that the Electoral
College advanced an anti-democratic agenda.125 While Mason may well have
118. YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra note 100; see Rakove, supra note 115.
119. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 29.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 29.
122. Id. at 30.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id.
125. See Jason Brennan, Opinion: The Electoral College is Anti-democratic––And That’s a Good
Thing, MKT. WATCH (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:39 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-electoral-college-is-anti-democraticand-thats-a-good-thing-2016-09-12 (agreeing that the Electoral College is indeed anti-democratic, but suggesting that it is a good thing because the Electoral College serves as a
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held such views, he arguably did not influence the Constitution as he refused
to sign the final product and became one of its leading opponents during the
ratification.126
It was only at the close of this phase of the debate that the issue of race
that has so obsessed today’s Electoral College critics first emerged. Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina rose to support Mason’s arguments that most
voters would not have the knowledge, due to the size of the nation, to choose
knowledgeably among multiple candidates.127 Comparing election by the
people with election by the legislature, he said, was like comparing “app[ointment] by lot, and by choice.”128 He worried that because of the lack of information, voters would generally choose candidates from their states, which
would give large states the advantage.129 Invoking the advantage of slavery,
Williamson declared: “This will not be Virg[ini]a however. Her slaves will
have no suffrage.”130 He was pointing out a comparative loss of power for the
slave states under Morris’s plan. Infamously, the Great Compromise included
three-fifths of slaves in a state’s population for allocating seats in the House
of Representatives, even though the South did not allow them to vote. But if
the Constitution allowed for the direct election of the president, the southern
states would lose that three-fifths advantage, which only applied to the
makeup of Congress.131 After Williamson spoke, the Convention rejected
Morris’s motion and unanimously affirmed legislative election of the president.132
The delegates, however, quickly backtracked out of concerns over executive independence.133 Just two days after rejecting Morris and Wilson’s pleas
for direct election, the Convention made the choices that set the Electoral College in its final form.134 Initially, they decided that the single seven-year term
check for when the majority votes to elect an obviously corrupt leader).
126. See, e.g., GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 349 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). Mason’s objections were known to have been published in at least
twenty-seven newspapers from Maine to South Carolina and served as a sounding board for numerous
Federalist and Anti-Federalist essays. See id. at 348.
127. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 32.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 29–32.
130. Id. at 32.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 50.
134. See id.
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for a president would lower the incentives for success created by the prospect
of re-election.135 They began by lifting the single term limit.136 But once they
made a president re-eligible for election, they worried that he would seek ways
to please the legislature, which would control his re-appointment.137 Re-opening the battle he had just lost, Morris again moved for the direct election of
the president.138 “If he is to be the Guardian of the people let him be appointed
by the people[.]”139 Like others stung by experience under the state revolutionary constitutions, Morris believed that unrestrained legislatures posed the
greater threat to the people’s liberties.140 “[T]he Executive Magistrate should
be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, a[gainst] Legislative
tyranny . . . .”141 With the President eligible for re-election, a majority of the
delegates agreed with Morris that Congress should no longer hold the power
of appointment because it would make the executive dependent on the legislature.142 “[A] dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render
it the Execut[ive] as well as the maker of laws[,]” Madison observed at this
point in the debate.143 “[T]hen according to the observation of Montesquieu,
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner.”144
Madison joined Wilson’s solution to subject presidential selection to popular choice, but in doing so also brought race back to the surface.145 Because
legislative selection would introduce “intrigues and contentions” that would
produce “an improper connection between the two departments,” Madison
concluded that “[t]he people at large,” were “as likely as any that could be
devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character.”146
But popular election created an important “difficulty.”147 The northern states
had granted the right to vote more broadly than the southern states, “and the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 34, 116.
See id. at 33, 50.
See id. at 33, 50, 58.
See id. at 52–54.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34, 61.
See id. at 34.
Id.
See id. at 56–57.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
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latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”148
To maintain the South’s population advantage due to the counting of threefifths of the slaves, Madison declared that “[t]he substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to the fewest objections.”149 By a 6–3 vote on July 19, 1787, the Convention approved a motion
by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut to replace legislative selection with an
electoral college system.150
Critics of the Electoral College consider this critical vote to reveal the
desire of the Framers to advantage slavery, and hence introduce racism into
the Constitution.151 This racism critique, however, does not comport with the
manner in which the Framers actually voted. Of course, Williamson and Madison argued that direct popular election of the President would work to the
disadvantage of the southern states, compared to legislative election, while an
elector system would restore the balance.152 But in the July 19 vote first adopting the Electoral College system, the delegates did not vote along slavery
lines.153 Paterson, who proposed the system, represented the free state of New
Jersey and was an abolitionist.154 Pointing out that the Articles of Confederation “had been ashamed to use the term ‘Slaves’ & had substituted a description,” he had helped persuade the Convention to give Congress the power to
ban the slave trade after 1808.155 Paterson certainly would not have proposed
a system to give the southern states greater power for racist reasons.156 When
it came time to vote, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia approved the replacement of legislative choice with special electors.157 Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina voted against.158 The
free states voted unanimously for the electoral system, but so did Virginia, the

148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 58.
151. See Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935, 936 (1996).
152. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 94.
153. See id. at 50.
154. Id. at 97–98, 664.
155. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 6 (3d ed. 2015).
156. See Leonard B. Rosenberg, Essay on William Paterson, WILLIAM PATERSON U.,
https://www.wpunj.edu/university/history/essay_williampaterson.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
157. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 98.
158. Id.
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leading slave state.159 Three slave states voted against, which directly undermines the claim that racism drove approval of the Electoral College.160 The
vote also breaks down along North versus South, but again, the leading state
of the South, Virginia, voted for the electors.161
Another factor that often goes unaddressed is that this July 19 vote occurred about two months before final adoption of the electoral system.162
Leading legal scholars often end their account of the Framers’ design of the
Electoral College with this decision, but neglect its development in a more
democratic direction.163 For example, almost immediately after the July 19
vote, the Convention reversed course 180 degrees to restore congressional
election of the president,164 and even reconsidered again a single term limit,
and a period in office of anywhere from six to twenty years.165 Debate began
to roam all over the map, with one delegate proposing a three-person presidency, with one representative from each region of the nation, another suggesting that a subcommittee of Congress pick the president, and another recommending that the choice fall to state governors.166
During these wanderings, Madison again urged the use of electors, but
this time Madison did not mention the slave state advantage in an electoral
system.167 He continued his opposition to congressional elections, which he
worried would “agitate & divide the legislature,” lead to “intrigue” between
the president and the dominant majority in Congress, or provide an opening
for interference from abroad.168 It also made little sense to grant Congress the
power to choose the executive: “One object of the Natl. Executive, so far as it
would have a negative on the laws, was to control the Natl. Legislature
. . . .”169 Rather, Madison stressed that electors “chosen for the occasion,
would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment,” which he

159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 50.
163. See Earl M. Maltz, The Presidency, the Electoral College, and the Three-Fifths Clause, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 439, 440–41 (2013).
164. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 101.
165. Id. at 100–02.
166. Slonim, supra note 99, at 44–45.
167. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, 108–11.
168. Id. at 109.
169. Id. at 110.
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predicted “would [provide] very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption.”170
But if the Convention continued to reject an Electoral College, Madison believed the only alternative was direct popular election, despite the voters’ lack
of information on candidate nationwide and their favoritism toward local
sons.171 “With all its imperfections he liked this best.”172 In fact, Madison
conceded that the North would outweigh the South in numbers of voters
(though he believed that the South’s population would grow), but as a Southerner “he was willing to make the sacrifice.”173 Nevertheless, the Convention
continued to reject amendments to lengthen the presidential term in office and
to limit re-eligibility.174
Madison’s defense of popular election did not win any converts.175 “A
popular election in this case is radically vicious,” Gerry argued on July 25,
because “the ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one
set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert” to prevail, such
as the Order of the Cincinnati.176 However, support continued to build for
electors because of concern over executive independence from the legislature.177 “The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence
from abroad,” Pierce Butler of South Carolina declared.178 “It will be difficult
to avoid either if the Election be made by the National Legislature.”179 “On
the other hand, the Gov[ernment] should not be made so complex & unwieldy
as to disgust the States,” Butler warned. “This would be the case, if the election [should] be referred to the people.”180 The best way to accommodate state
interests was election by electors chosen by the states, he concluded.181 Morris
again attacked “the undue influence of the Legislature.”182 He “considered an
election by the people as the best, by the Legislature as the worst, mode.”183
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Morris therefore “could not but favor the idea of” electors.184 But when the
delegates took a break and created a Committee of Detail to transform their
deliberations into a unified draft, they still supported congressional election
of the president (by a 7–3 vote), though for a single seven-year term.185
When the Committee on Detail reported its draft of the Constitution, the
delegates occupied themselves with debates over the congressional process
for choosing the president.186 But then, at the end of their deliberations, on
August 31, Morris suddenly moved to strike out the draft’s authorization for
Congress to choose the president.187 He prevailed by the extraordinary vote
of 9–1, with one abstention.188 The debates contain no explanation why, but
as Stanford historian Jack Rakove has argued, “a growing reaction against the
Senate worked in favor of the presidency, encouraging those framers who opposed legislative election and favored re-eligibility to renew their efforts.”189
In other words, as the delegates understood that the body representing the
states would have a veto over most powers of the federal government—the
passage of laws, the confirmation of executive officers and judges, the adoption of treaties—the nationalists among them sought to free the President from
its grasp.190 With no method for choosing the president in the working draft,
the delegates sent the question to the well-named Committee on Unfinished
Parts for decision.191
On September 4, the Committee returned with today’s Electoral College,
though with the Senate serving as the backup method should no candidate win
a majority.192 The delegates observed that an Electoral College would reduce
the chances for intrigue and corruption because it would come into being only
to select a president and then disband.193 It would eliminate presidential dependence on Congress through the promise of appointment.194 It did not
184. Id.
185. Id. at 120.
186. See Maltz, supra note 163, at 458–61.
187. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 480.
188. Id. at 471, 480.
189. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 263 (1996).
190. Id.
191. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 380.
192. Id. at 497–98 (outlining the process for how the president is elected by the electorate and how
Senate chooses the president where there is no majority).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 522.
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disrupt the fundamental bargain made between the large and small states over
Congress by allocating electoral vote by population, giving the state legislatures the right to choose, and giving each state two additional votes.195 In
defending the committee’s work, Morris explained that “[no one] had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature” and “many
were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people.”196 Relying on
electors would address “the danger of intrigue & faction if the appoinm[en]t
should be made by the Legislature” and “the indispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature.”197 Mason praised the new
system because it “removed some capital objections, particularly the danger
of cabal and corruption.”198 The Convention rejected every proposal to restore
the choice to the legislature, but also voted 10–1 to give the House—voting
by state delegation—the power to choose the president should the Electoral
College fail to agree.199
When the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention explained their work
to the state conventions responsible for ratifying the Constitution, they fairly
described the different values they balanced.200 But they also argued that the
Electoral College would produce presidents of leading character and filter out
the unsuitable.201 Here, Trump’s election demonstrated that the process did
guarantee the substance.
When the Constitution went to the states for approval, the issue that had
so beset the Philadelphia delegates did not trigger a widespread outcry.202 In
fact, as Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 68, the Electoral College
was the only important part of the Constitution to have “escaped without severe censure” and had not “received the slightest mark of approbation from
its opponents.”203 Hamilton, for once, agreed with the Anti-Federalists that
“if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent.”204 Indeed, most
Anti-Federalist objections to the presidency focused on its substantive
195. Id. at 265 (discussing how the Electoral College, in effect, limited the advantage of the larger
states).
196. Id. at 500.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 529.
200. Id. at 500.
201. See id.
202. See Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove’s Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 637 (1997).
203. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 96, at 411 (Alexander Hamilton).
204. Id. at 411–12.
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powers, not the method for its selection, or likely collusion between the executive branch and the Senate to seize power.205 George Mason’s Objections to
the Constitution, a leading Anti-Federalist critique widely circulated in September 1787, does not even mention the Electoral College.206 To the extent
that they attacked it, Anti-Federalists worried more about the chances for foreign bribery of the electors or the President himself, rather than racism or state
advantages in the system.207
Hamilton fairly reported the values that had guided the delegates, though
he left out the heated arguments and the many shifts of position. Democracy
remained the guiding principle.208 “It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust
was to be confided,” he wrote in The Federalist No. 68.209 But in order to
foster deliberation and access the broadest knowledge, the Constitution placed
the choice in the hands of electors who “will be most likely to possess the
information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.”210
Mediating the choice through the electors, Hamilton predicted, would also
“afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder”––unregulated
passion, in other words.211
Hamilton also repeated the reasons for removing the choice from the legislature.212 He argued that the Electoral College would prevent the “cabal,
intrigue, and corruption” that would arise if Congress were to choose.213 Hamilton argued, as did his fellow nationalists in the Constitutional Convention,
that Congress would be the seat of such conspiracies, and hence the Presidency should be made independent of it.214 The Philadelphia delegates “have
not made the appointment of the president to depend on [any] pre-existing
205. See generally id. at 413 (“They have not made the appointment of the president to depend on
any pre-existing bodies of men who might be tampered with [beforehand] to prostitute their votes; but
they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted
in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.”).
206. GEORGE MASON, supra note 126, at 349. Mason’s objections were known to have been published in at least twenty-seven newspapers from Maine to South Carolina and served as a sounding
board for numerous Federalist and Anti-Federalist essays. See id. at 348.
207. See RAKOVE, supra note 189, at 268–75.
208. Id. at 412.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 412–13.
213. Id. at 412.
214. Id. at 412–13.
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bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their
votes,” but instead vested the power into a group of electors chosen “for the
temporary and sole purpose” of selecting the president.215 Choice by electors
would also support the president’s continuing independence from Congress,
rather than “sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favour was
necessary” for his continuance in office.216 By rejecting legislative selection
of the president, the Electoral College advanced the fundamental principle that
“the executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all, but
the people themselves.”217
The Federalists, however, failed in their predictions that this system not
only would prevent “cabal, intrigue, and corruption,” but would also produce
Presidents of the highest caliber.218 “This process of election affords a moral
certainty,” Hamilton promised, “that the office of President will seldom fall
to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”219 Hamilton’s praise for the Constitution here certainly
went too far.220 “It will not be too strong to say,” he wrote, “that there will be
a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for
ability and virtue.”221 The Federalists did not clearly explain why the Electoral College would produce such high characters.222 They may have relied
on the widespread understanding that George Washington would be the first
president. As Pierce Butler wrote afterward, he did not believe that the President’s powers “would have been so great had not many of the members [at
Philadelphia] cast their eyes towards General Washington as President; and
shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions
of his Virtue.”223 They may have further assumed that only the truly outstanding characters would have the continent-wide reputation, in an age of poor
communications, to win an Electoral College majority.224
But the Framers did not anticipate that the Electoral College would
215. Id. at 413.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 412.
219. Id. at 414.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301–02 (Max Farrand ed. 1911);
see also YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra note 100, at ch 2.
224. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 48, at 29 (remarks by Morris).
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establish a framework that created room for other purposes to assume a role.
While more majoritarian than congressional or Senate selection of the president, the Electoral College advanced the primary objective of the Framers to
reduce the ability of faction or party to control the government for its own
ends. It was of a piece with other mechanisms, most notably the Senate and
the judiciary, designed to decentralize and diffuse power over domestic issues
within the federal government. Others, such as Thomas Jefferson, Martin van
Buren, and most especially Woodrow Wilson, would use party government to
modify the Framers’ design. It is their innovations that have given us a selection system that elevates the president through a quasi-plebiscitary process in
which political parties cooperate to advance a political platform adopted in a
nationwide election.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Rather than a racist institution, the Electoral College advanced a more
democratic voice in the selection of the president. We should not forget that
the Framers started from a baseline—the Articles of Confederation—which
gave all important decisions to the states. Their first proposal for legislative
selection would have created a more democratic executive, but one too subservient to Congress. Delegates who supported a powerful, independent president, such as Madison, Morris, and Wilson, pressed for direct popular election. But they could not overcome the concerns of delegates such as Mason,
who feared that limited communications and the vast size of the country would
prevent voters from making an educated choice. Nevertheless, the Framers
reached a compromise in the Electoral College which balanced nationalism
with federalism. But unlike the Great Compromise over the makeup of the
House and Senate, the nationalists prevailed in centering the selection of the
president in popular choice, but mediated through the states. Democracy operates to choose the president, but within the states. “Thus[,] the essential
spirit of the Electoral College, like that of the Constitution in general, was
fundamentally democratic from the outset,” observed political scientist Martin Diamond.225
Criticism that the Framers intentionally designed the Electoral College,
in the words of Amar, to “advantage Southern white male propertied

225. MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 6
(1977).
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slaveholders in the antebellum era” seems off the mark.226 Instead, the Founders believed that their unusual system would organize democracy through the
states.227 If we should discard with the Electoral College as an obstacle to the
majority, critics should explain why the American people should retain the
Constitution’s other limits on pure majoritarian democracy. The separation
of powers, for example, handicaps Washington, D.C.’s ability to govern.228
Why not replace it with a British-style parliament, where the head of the majority party in Congress would form a cabinet of fellow members to control
the executive agencies? Federalism further restricts national powers.229 Why
not follow European models again and replace the states with administrative
districts subordinate to the national government? Judicial review and the Bill
of Rights, for that matter, also poses limits on the majority. We could again
follow modern Britain and leave the creation and definition of individual liberties to the legislature.
The same charges that critics bring against the Electoral College apply to
Congress as well. Amar’s and Finkelman’s claim that the Electoral College
rests on racist foundations have force only because it incorporated the same
three-fifths rule that applied to the allocation of House seats.230 But the Civil
War and the constitutional settlement that followed, codified in the Thirteenth
(ending slavery), Fourteenth (recognizing equal protection and due process of
law), and Fifteenth Amendments (guaranteeing the right to vote), ended the
three-fifths rule and extirpated the formal legal influence of slavery.231 Today
we commonly think of the House as the most democratically accountable and
responsive element of the federal government, even though the Constitution
continues to allocate seats by state.232 Reconstruction ended the advantage of
the slave states in the Electoral College as well.233 A century would pass until

226. See Amar, supra 88, at 472.
227. See Muller, supra note 39, at 1243.
228. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 639 (1984) (describing the divided federal government as
“sufficiently distracted by internal competition to avoid the threat of tyranny”).
229. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (“In
the compound republic of America . . . a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”).
230. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868).
231. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV.
232. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also id. art. II, § 1 (noting the Fourteenth Amendment’s
end to the advantage of former slave states afforded to those states by the Electoral College).
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a son of the South would win the presidency. In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson
won his great victory in the outpouring of grief after the Kennedy assassination.234 Woodrow Wilson, the only other president from the South, had spent
his professional career in the North, receiving his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins,
taught at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan, and Princeton, and served as President of
Princeton and Governor of New Jersey.235
Of course, the Framers gave an advantage to the states in selecting the
Chief Executive. Recently, that difference has not mattered, except in close
contests, such as the 2000 and 2016 elections. But the Electoral College’s
departure from the principle of “one person, one vote,” first required by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, grates on modern democratic
sensibilities.236 “I believe strongly that in a democracy, we should respect the
will of the people,” Hillary Clinton had said after the 2000 election, “and to
me that means it’s time to do away with the Electoral College and move to the
popular election of our president.”237 While Trump might have won the presidency had the Framers chosen direct popular election, that results seems unlikely in light of Clinton’s large majorities in major American cities.238 Federalism clearly worked to Trump’s advantage.
But if critics dislike the amplified voice of the states, they have much
more to worry about than the Electoral College. Consider the Constitution
itself: It did not take effect by a simple nationwide majority vote. Instead, it
adopted a procedure for its own ratification more similar to the Electoral College than any other form of lawmaking. Article VII required nine out of the
thirteen states approve the Constitution, using special conventions called
solely for the purpose.239 No state ratified the document through its legislature, nor did any state have a direct plebiscite to approve the Constitution.
Much like a presidential election, the ratification of the Constitution turned on

234. See generally ROBERT CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF POWER
(2012).
235. See generally RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN
LIBERALISM (2005).
236. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
237. See Jonathan Mahler & Steve Eder, The Electoral College is Hated by Many. So Why does it
Endure?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/the-electoral-college-is-hated-by-many-so-why-does-it-endure.html.
238. See William H. Frey, A Substantial Majority of Americans Live Outside Trump Counties, Census Shows, BROOKINGS (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/03/23/asubstantial-majority-of-americans-live-outside-trump-counties-census-shows/.
239. U.S. CONT. art VII.
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assembling a majority coalition within each state, with its own unique political
history and culture, and then combining them into the required nine states.240
Amending the Constitution repeats the same combination of federal and state
approval. Once two-thirds of Congress passes an amendment, it goes to the
states for ratification by three-quarters.
Indeed, the Constitution channels and limits majority rule throughout its
basic structure. The Electoral College may have allowed the states to choose
Trump because of the small difference in the popular vote. But the states
enjoy an even greater advantage in the national government in the Senate,
where state equality gives the same number of votes to Wyoming, with its
563,767 residents, as to California, with 37,254,503 residents.241 The Framers
routed all of Congress’s important powers through the Senate, and hence gave
the states a veto over most major federal policies.242 Washington, D.C. cannot
pass laws, raise taxes, or spend money without approval by the representatives
of the states. The president cannot appoint any judges, cabinet members, or
principal government officers without the Senate, nor can he make any treaties
without its advice and consent. The Constitution established these supermajority and non-democratic procedures to promote more reason and less passion in government, and to rest public policies on a broader consensus in society.243
Even the Constitution’s most democratic element, the House of Representatives, give states an advantage. While the number of House seats depends on the population, the Constitution grants them to the states by districts.244 Only an allocation of seats by national party performance, where a
Democratic nationwide victory of 60 percent would receive exactly 261 of the
435 representatives, would follow majoritarianism perfectly. Otherwise, the
diversity of people, interests, and geography will produce uneven results
across districts. Imbalances in party performance in different districts, for
example, could easily produce legislative majorities that do not reflect the
240. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 1787–1788
(Simon Schuster ed., 2010).
241. See Petrocelli, supra note 9.
242. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1329 (2001)
243. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 703, 707 (2002); John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1702 (2010).
244. See Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and
Constitutional Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1137 (2011).
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popular will. Suppose rural and urban districts numbered roughly 50–50, but
the Republican party won the former by slight margins, while the Democratic
party ran up huge majorities in the latter. In such a situation, the Republican
party might achieve a majority of the House seats while losing in the overall
popular vote. Indeed, modern gerrymandering seeks to compact an opponent’s supporters into districts to win by larger margins, while spreading out
one’s own supporters to win more districts, but by smaller margins.245 The
Constitution vests the power to draw House districts in the state legislatures,
subject to federal regulation, which recognizes state sovereign interests in the
House.246
Even in Britain’s parliamentary system, the use of geographic districts
has yielded governments that won a majority of the seats without a majority
of the population.247 Such a result is even more likely with more than two
political parties, both in a parliamentary system and the Electoral College itself.248 Thanks to the third-party runs of Ross Perot, Bill Clinton handily won
the Electoral College twice even though he won only 43 percent of the national vote in 1992 and 49 percent in 1996.249 In 1992, only a single state,
Arkansas, provided a popular majority for any candidate.250 Eighty years earlier, the third-party effort by former President Theodore Roosevelt swung the
victory to Woodrow Wilson, who ran up 435 of the electors but only 41.8
percent of the popular vote.251
We should also not neglect the benefits of a state-based district system.
Dispersing the power to choose the President into 50 states, with winner-take-

245. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5th ed. 2016).

THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE

246. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash & John Yoo, People ≠ Legislature, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 341, 342 (2017).
247. See Jack Blumenau, What Would Britain Look Like Under Proportionate Representation (May
6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/06/what-would-britainlook-like-under-proportional-representation/.
248. See id.; Ky Fullerton, Bush, Gore, and the 2000 Presidential Election: Time for the Electoral
College to Go?, 80 OR. L. REV. 717, 717–18 (2001) (“[T]he four elections in which a President assumed office without winning the popular vote.”).
249. See Christopher Klein, Here’s How Third-Party Candidates Have Changed Elections, HIST.
(May 31, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/third-party-candidates-election-influence-facts.
250. 1992 Presidential General Election Results–Arkansas, U.S. ELECTION ATLAS, https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=5&year=1992&f=0&off=0&elect=0 (last visited Feb. 28,
2019).
251. See Klein, supra note 249 (“Roosevelt and Taft ended up splitting the Republican vote, which
led to an easy victory by Democratic nominee Woodrow Wilson.”).
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all rules, tends to undermine the formation of large interest groups that can
dictate the outcome. Of course, such groups could form, and one might even
argue that the two political parties are great “factions,” in the words of The
Federalist No. 10,252 but coordinating their campaigns across the states necessary to win 270 electoral votes presents greater costs and challenges than
assembling a popular majority in the largest cities.253 In close elections, the
Electoral College may give minorities an exaggerated influence in comparison
to their national size.254 Because of the winner-take-all rule, a minority group
in a critical state could swing the balance of its electoral votes, and hence the
outcome of a close election.255 The flip-side of these tendencies also gives the
candidates the incentive to bring together a broad, nationwide coalition that
can compete in the different regions of the nation.256 A direct popular election
would instead encourage the candidates to only campaign in the major cities
of the east and west coasts.257 This is not to say that regional candidates could
not prevail, as Lincoln demonstrated in 1860, but many (if not most) who have
appealed solely to sectional interests have lost.258
Other arguments in favor of the Electoral College, however, do not persuade as once they might have. Some have observed that the system magnifies the political legitimacy of the president, because the winner-take-all rule
transforms state pluralities into electoral vote majorities.259 Bill Clinton might
win just 43 percent of the national vote, but his large Electoral College majority gives him a political legitimacy he might otherwise lack.260 It seems unclear, however, whether presidents with large electoral majorities should have
a false sense of confidence in their political support within the nation, nor
whether the other branches should grant these chief executives the same political respect that might come with a large popular majority.261 Presidents
elected by pluralities or slim majorities might pursue a course of cooperation
with Congress, which might have a better claim to popular support, rather than
252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77–78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
253. ALEXANDER. S. BELENKY, WHO WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT? 90 (Springer, 2d ed. 2012).
254. See Amar, supra note 88, at 472.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 473.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See BEST, supra note 55, at 55–57.
260. See Katherine Florey, Losing Bargain: Why Winner-Take-All Vote Assignment is the Electoral
College’s Least Defensible Feature, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 317, 356 (2017).
261. See id. at 356–58.
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pressing an agenda born out of a false sense of electoral mandate.262
Another argument in defense of the Electoral College makes much of certainty. Supporters once claimed that the Constitution’s system provided a
clear winner by the end of election night, due again to the winner-takes-all
rule.263 Once a candidate reached enough states to get to 270 electoral votes,
it no longer mattered to get the nationwide popular vote count precisely
right.264 Under a direct popular election, however, a close election might require the exact vote count, which could lead to long delays or open the door
to cheating or fraud.265 But the Bush v. Gore controversy showed that such
concerns could afflict the Electoral College system too.266 A closely divided
nation, as in 2000 or 2004 for that matter, brought the choice of president
down to the results in a single state (Florida in 2000, Ohio in 2004).267 The
Florida recount left the eventual outcome in doubt and required the Supreme
Court to intervene to force the state to deliver its electoral votes by a federallymandated deadline.268 As Amar observes, if direct elections work just fine in
statewide elections for governor, even of large states such as California,
Texas, and New York, we can accept the same uncertainty for national elections too.269 Very close elections, however, might place the country in a state
of uncertainty, which the nation cannot suffer for very long given the central
role of the President for national security and law enforcement.270
The broad-brush democracy criticism ultimately asks the wrong question.
Simple majoritarianism is not in itself an instrumental success for government; rather, we should ask whether the Electoral College advances other values in our Constitution’s republican system. As we have seen, the Framers
originally set out to block factional or regional candidates by creating a system
in which only characters with a continent-wide reputation for public service
could succeed. As else in their design, they foresaw that a primary threat to
the new government would come from faction. Devices such as the separation
262. See BEST, supra note 55, at 193.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See BEST, supra note 55, at 193 (discussing that maintaining certainty is an objective of the
electoral system and how the “potential for fraud arises when an election is very close”).
266. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
267. Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v.
Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1868, 1879 (2013).
268. Bush, 531 U.S. at 101–03.
269. Amar, supra note 88, at 475.
270. See BEST, supra note 55, at 193.
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of powers responded to the evils after the Revolution, when simple majorities
had taken over state governments and misused their powers to override individual rights and enact special interest legislation.271 The Electoral College’s
decentralization would allow only national figures to rise to the presidency,
thereby shunting aside candidates who catered to a specific faction or region.272
Donald Trump’s victory did not demonstrate the realization of the Founders’ plans for the Electoral College, but its failures. Early days had first born
out Hamilton’s hopes in The Federalist No. 68 for choosing the President.273
Despite the vicious partisan conflicts of the early 19th Century, our first Chief
Executives were certainly the leading political figures of their day: George
Washington won the nation’s independence on the battlefield; John Adams
led the political fight for independence; Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence and was governor of Virginia; James Madison drafted
the Constitution and led the fight for ratification of the Constitution; James
Monroe was Secretary of State and a leading Jeffersonian in Congress; John
Quincy Adams was one of America’s greatest diplomats. Even Andrew Jackson, who attacked the 1824 elections for going to the House after the Electoral
College deadlocked, saved the nation in the 1814 Battle of New Orleans and
added Florida to the union.274
The United States also has had its runs of mediocre presidents, especially
just before the Civil War and after Reconstruction. The years 1850–1861 included forgettable Chief Executives such as Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce,
and James Buchanan, while 1877–1896 witnessed weak Oval Office occupants such as Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Grover
Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison. Average to poor performance in office,
however, may owe more to circumstances than to ability. Solving the crisis
over slavery may have fallen beyond the ability of any American president
until secession and Civil War brought Abraham Lincoln’s gifts to the fore.
Exhaustion from Reconstruction and the economic boom of the Gilded Age
may have demanded little from the Chief Executives. These runs of mediocrity may have little to do with the Electoral College and everything to do with
circumstance. We see no great presidents in these eras because the nation did

271.
272.
273.
274.
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not need greatness in its presidents.275
Trump’s election, however, proved Hamilton wrong in his claim that the
Electoral College would weed out the very worst candidates. Between the
Revolution and the Constitution, known by American historians as the Critical
Period, leading nationalists grew concerned that unrestrained democracy in
the states had led to instability in government, the invasion of individual
rights, and the insecurity of property.276 Earlier “wholly popular” forms of
government in ancient Greece and Rome and Renaissance Italy had suffered
from similar “instability, injustice, and confusion.”277 Because they had such
faith in the people, the Framers attributed such problems to unreflective majority rule––in other words, the passions, as opposed to reason––unconstrained by “a more perfect structure.”278 The Constitution would prevent the
people from making rash decisions by hemming in the legislature with the
executive and judicial branches.279 But the Presidency also raised the possibility of demagogues, who could use their powers of persuasion to further
mislead the people.280
Hamilton admitted that demagogues might rise in a single state. But he
argued that such figures could not deceive the Electoral College, which represented the great breadth of the nation.281 “Talents for low intrigue, and the
little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors
in a single State,” Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 68.282 “[B]ut it will
require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it
as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States.”283 The Framers could not
have anticipated Donald Trump’s public life in more accurate terms. “Talents

275. See YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra note 100, at chs. 8–9.
276. See generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 4–6 (1984);
WOOD, supra note 108, at 393–423.
277. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 252, at 77 (James Madison).
278. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
279. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing the separation of powers between the three branches of government).
280. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (acknowledging the history of tyrants and demagogues but arguing that the Constitution is the safest
course to the liberty of the people).
281. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 96, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton).
282. Id.
283. Id.
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for low intrigue,” and “the little arts of popularity” describe a career founded
on reality television, branding hotels and casinos, and appeals to some of the
worst instincts in the electorate. Trump seems to revel in tactical politics and
driving the 24-hour news cycle, exactly as Hamilton feared in The Federalist
No. 68.
The Federalist assumed that a demagogue could not successfully appeal
to the people in all of the states, separated as they were by the slowness of
communications, the differences in political culture, and lack of knowledge
of national affairs. The Framers relied on these reasons, which had persuaded
the Philadelphia Convention against direct popular election of the president,
to protect the nation against a populist leader. But they could not predict the
changes in technology and media that have accelerated the instantaneous
speed of information, the spread of a common political culture, and the nationalization of politics through the Democrat and Republican parties. The
Framers also imagined that a demagogue would appeal to the people’s temporary biases, so they designed a system that would dilute the popular voice.
They believed that state interests would stand athwart populism, rather than
raise up a populist candidate such as Trump.
The Electoral College’s failure to filter out a candidate such as Trump,
however, does not provide the basis for proposals for radical change. One
question worth asking is whether direct majoritarian election of a president
would make the selection of a demagogue more or less likely. Political philosophers once thought direct democracy might make demagogues more
likely—after all, the word refers to someone who is speaking to the people,
the demos, for their support.284 A direct election would make the demagogue’s path to power easier, by allowing him to win the presidency by appealing only to the inhabitants of the nation’s largest cities.285
The non-constitutional practices that have grown up around the Electoral
College have gone some way toward increasing the legitimacy of the winner.
As political scientist James W. Ceaser argues, succeeding generations have
built upon the Framer’s design to pursue different theories of presidential selection.286 Jefferson soon replaced the Framer’s original vision with the idea
that the presidential election would present a choice between policy

284. See JAMES W. CEASAR, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 1–40 (1979).
285. Id.
286. Id.

868

[Vol. 46: 833, 2019]

A Defense of the Electoral College
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

programs.287 Developed further by Martin Van Buren, this new approach relied upon national political parties to present these platforms in each state,
making the presidential election a choice on the issues.288 Political parties,
however, would also constrain the presidents and moderate any rapid change
in national politics.289 Seeking to burst partisan limitations on the presidency,
Woodrow Wilson reversed the Framers’ starting point that the electoral system should frustrate popular leaders.290 Instead, he saw the selection of a president in a plebiscitary manner as the only way to clothe the president with the
legitimacy to lead the nation in sweeping reform.291 Wilson’s views have prevailed today: it was his idea that the people, rather than the parties, should
control the nominating process; that the president should draw legitimacy for
his agenda from his nationwide selection; and that the political party instead
should help the president in enacting his program.292
This is not to argue that direct national election of the President would
not have the same features. It certainly would, and probably in greater degree
than the Electoral College. But Ceasar shows that the Electoral College system can promote these purposes too, thanks to the manner in which Jefferson,
Van Buren, and Wilson have grafted their non-constitutional, political designs
atop the Framers’ original design. And perhaps the Electoral College does so
without running as high a risk of demagogues or of a tyranny of the majority
as direct popular election of a President. In this respect, the Electoral College
fits in with other aspects of the original constitutional design––the separation
of powers, the Senate, and federalism––designed to limit government powers
and to render political change difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
Today’s opinion commentary joins many scholarly views to discard the
Electoral College in favor of direct popular election. They support a movement, the NPV initiative, which asks state legislatures to replace the winnertakes-all rule for assigning their electoral votes. Instead of giving their electoral votes to the winner of its own election, state legislatures under the NPV
287.
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292.
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movement would designate them for whomever wins the majority vote in the
nation as a whole. Thus, even if Trump won the election in a state that had
adopted the NPV rule, the state would still assign the votes to Clinton because
she won the majority of all votes in the country. NPV strikes at the heart of
the reason why the Electoral College favors the states over majority rule: the
winner-take-all rule. “The operation of the winner-take-all system results in
effective massive disenfranchisement of voters supporting losing candidates,”
write critics Lawrence Longley and Neal Peirce.293 Critics, however, often
overlook that the Constitution does not require this feature of the presidential
election, but that the issue remains with state legislatures.
The NPV would effectively undo the spirit of the Electoral College, even
though it would observe the letter of the Constitution, which leaves to the state
legislatures the choice of electors. It would have the states coordinate their
right to choose the electors by simultaneously replacing winner-take-all with
the national majority rule. It would have a radical impact on presidential campaigns. Under the current rule, candidates have an incentive to win as many
states as possible by 51 percent. Winning by larger margins suggests that a
campaign spent too many resources that it could have better spent in a state
where it lost by a close vote.294 As a result, winner-take-all encourages candidates to widen their campaigns to many states, and to build national coalitions that may serve to moderate their positions.295 They should spend little
time in the friendliest and most hostile states and instead campaign hardest in
the swing states that could go for either candidate. Thus, in the 2016 elections,
Trump should have spent little time in Texas or California; he won because
he received bare majorities in states that had gone for Obama four years earlier, such as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
NPV would have the reverse effect. It would encourage presidential candidates to campaign primarily in densely-populated cities and counties and to
deepen their ideological commitment to the positions that most appeal to their
voters. Candidates would seek to run up the highest totals possible in their
ideologically compatible states and ignore regions where they might have to
moderate their positions. Ironically, an NPV might produce the very result
that led the Framers to reject direct popular election: candidates who
293. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 69, at 136.
294. TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 79
(2004).
295. BEST, supra note 55, at 66 (quoting JAMES MCGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF
DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 251 (1963)).
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championed different regions of the nation.
But the NPV suffers from a serious constitutional problem itself, because
it only takes effect if a majority of states adopt the NPV rule—which may
amount to an unconstitutional compact between the states that requires congressional approval. But putting this problem aside, the NPV would exacerbate, not alleviate, the problem posed by Trump’s election. Trump is unusual
because his populist movement found support in the states, rather than the
nation as a whole. The nation as a whole, however, did not embrace Hillary
Clinton’s agenda, as it returned majorities for the Republican party in the
House of Representatives, the Senate, and a majority of governorships and
statehouses.
Nevertheless, our constitutional system relies upon the state structure to
dissipate and ultimately defuse rash popular movements—just as it successfully did with the original Populist moment in the late 19th Century. Replacing one of the Constitution’s elements of federalism might seem to respond to
Trump’s 2016 victory, but it would make the rise of a future demagogue far
more likely. Under the NPV, a future populist need only appeal to urban majorities to win the presidency. Overreaction to Trump could do far more longterm harm to the Constitution than Trump could ever do.
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